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Abstract 
Information security (InfoSec) violations have negative organisational and 
personal impacts. Studies that examine key factors to motivate individuals to 
change their security related behaviours are important to promote safe 
computing. This paper presents a full nomology of the protection motivation 
theory (PMT) to study the impact of users’ InfoSec awareness on their security 
protection intention. It contributes to a better understanding of users’ InfoSec 
awareness through an examination of the impact of security education, training 
and awareness (SETA) programme on InfoSec threat and countermeasures 
awareness and the role of InfoSec awareness as an antecedent to the cognitive 
processes associated with coping and threat appraisals. In addition, this 
research contributes to extend PMT by investigating the role of fear and 
maladaptive rewards in explaining InfoSec behaviours. 
 
Keywords: Information security awareness, fear-appeal, protection motivation theory, 
security protection intention 
 
Introduction 
Due to the pervasive usage of the Internet worldwide and the presence of information security (InfoSec) 
violations on the Internet, users’ InfoSec awareness is a critical first step to achieve the safe and secured 
environment globally. Recent research has attempted to identify effective approaches to motivate users 
to protect their information assets with a particular emphasis on InfoSec behaviours of individuals 
within an organisational context (Boss et al., 2017; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Despite the 
importance of appropriate InfoSec behaviours in organisations, users’ personal InfoSec practice still 
remains a significant concern and the current literature on InfoSec does not pay enough attention to how 
users deal with InfoSec threats in their personal lives. 
According to Hanus and Wu (2016), more than 40% of computer users globally were victims to 
cybercrimes such as virus, phishing, social engineering, worm or malware attacks and it is estimated 
that more than half of these users were not completely sure whether their computers were free of any 
kind of viruses. In addition, almost one third of users do not recognise the potential risks associated 
with not properly protecting themselves and their information on the Internet. This evidence suggests 
that, regardless of all technological developments in the InfoSec domain, providing InfoSec training to 
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improve users’ awareness and their security protection regarding potential threats remains a priority to 
achieve safe and secured environments. Although previous research examined the role of security 
education, training and awareness (SETA) (D'Arcy  et al., 2009), the focus was on deterring individuals 
from fear of organisational sanctions rather than motivating them to engage in security behaviours based 
on their own calculations of consequences of security threats. Drawing on Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT), this study aims to extend the current body of knowledge by investigating the role of SETA 
programmes on users’ awareness and subsequent coping and threat appraisals. This study offers an 
explanation that links InfoSec awareness with intentions to practice InfoSec behaviours.  
In recent years, InfoSec literature has shifted from relying on general deterrence theories to having a 
stronger emphasis on PMT. General deterrence theories emphasise the concept of command and 
control, whilst PMT mostly focuses on using persuasive messages to warn people of a threat and explain 
countervailing measures and protective behaviours.  PMT is applicable to InfoSec contexts, where users 
require additional motivation in order to protect their information assets (Boss et al., 2017; Floyd, 
Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). Several InfoSec studies (e.g., Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; 
Dinev & Hu, 2007; Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012) have adopted PMT in their investigations, but 
they have not fully leveraged PMT.  In particular, they do not offer an explanation on how fear-appeal 
and maladaptive rewards shape InfoSec behaviours (Boss et al., 2017). In addition, although PMT has 
been widely used to examine different aspects of InfoSec, researchers have mostly paid attention to 
InfoSec issues in organisations. Previous studies that applied PMT to investigate individuals’ InfoSec 
protective behaviours reported conflicting results on the significance of the users’ protection motivation 
mechanism (e.g., Hanus & Wu, 2016; Liang & Xue, 2010). The review of InfoSec literature reported a 
gap in an investigation of antecedents of users’ threat and coping appraisals (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Milne 
et al., 2000). Therefore, this study aims to apply all PMT core constructs by investigating security 
awareness as an antecedent of threat and coping appraisals and subsequent InfoSec protection intention 
among computer and Internet users. 
SETA programmes provide users with the knowledge on InfoSec threats and solutions to avoid or 
mitigate the impact of security attacks. This study classifies awareness into threat awareness and 
countermeasure awareness to precisely examine how different types of awareness shape users’ InfoSec 
protection intention. According to previous InfoSec research, providing effective InfoSec awareness is 
considered the most cost effective solution to encourage users to adopt a more protective and proactive 
approach rather than a reactive approach (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Although the need for research on 
security awareness among users has been suggested, most of previous studies focused on organisational 
security policies to deter InfoSec threats. Even though the literature on PMT presents the importance of 
the sources of information that users apply to assess the importance of threats and their abilities to 
address such threats (Milne et al., 2000), the antecedents of threat and coping appraisals are frequently 
neglected in the literature. The present study aims to fill this gap and answer the question of 'what is  
the influence of SETA and user's coping and threat appraisals on their InfoSec behaviours?'  
The rest of this research is organised as follows. First, the relevant literature on InfoSec and a full 
nomology of PMT are presented. Then, the research model and hypotheses are proposed, followed by 
the discussion of research methodology and measurement scales. Finally, the results from a pilot study 
are reported, along with the discussion of the expected theoretical and practical contributions and 
possible limitations of this study. 
Literature Review  
InfoSec protection is recognised as a systematic effort to protect users from negative effects of 
cybercrimes. Previous research questioned the investigation of InfoSec education and awareness 
programme in relation to protection and prevention strategies (Dinev & Hu, 2007). SETA includes a 
series of programmes to promote InfoSec awareness by providing users with general InfoSec 
knowledge about threats along with skills to perform necessary InfoSec protection procedures. SETA 
programmes apply ongoing attempts (e.g., workshops, posters) that emphasise acceptable usage 
guidelines and highlight the potential consequences of InfoSec threats and vulnerabilities (D’Arcy et 
al., 2009). SETA programmes such as training would help users to improve their awareness of computer 
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and InfoSec issues and educate users about the consequences of potential InfoSec risks and how to 
protect their information and computer from them. Although previous security studies have looked at 
the benefits of SETA programmes and their positive influence on users’ security protective intentions 
(D’Arcy et al., 2009), there is a lack of empirical studies that explain the underlying cognitive processes 
connecting the relationship between SETA programmes and InfoSec protection intentions. 
InfoSec awareness is about promoting users’ knowledge of specific security risks or threats and the 
potential countermeasures against those risks to protect their information and computers. Researchers 
proposed including users’ InfoSec awareness in InfoSec models in order to better evaluate their InfoSec 
awareness intentions within their personal lives and in workplaces (Hanus & Wu, 2016). In addition, 
users are vulnerable to security threats and the lack of awareness is considered as the main issue to 
cause such vulnerability. Hence, InfoSec awareness should be seen as a necessity for users.  
Recently, InfoSec researchers have relied on PMT to investigate users’ InfoSec related processes. 
Originally, PMT is developed based on the anticipation of a negative outcome in individuals’ health 
and their willingness to minimise it in order to protect themselves. By extending this logic to InfoSec 
protection behaviours, one can argue that a user is motivated to practice InfoSec protection in order to 
avoid consequences of security threats.  In particular, PMT focuses on the concept of protection 
motivation to predict users’ protective intention after receiving fear arousing recommendations known 
as fear- appeals (Floyd et al., 2000).  Fear-appeals are persuasive messages developed to cause fear by 
explaining harmful consequences that will happen to them if individuals do not follow the 
recommendations in the messages. Findings from previous studies showed that fear-appeals explain a 
user’s protective intentions (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). 
PMT explains the relationship between fear-appeals and protective intentions through two mechanisms 
– threat appraisal and coping appraisal. A fear-appeal increases threat as well as efficacy by providing 
users with a recommendation to address the threat (Boss et al., 2015). Threat appraisal refers to the 
procedure of noticing the severity and vulnerability to a threat against the maladaptive rewards and 
maladaptive intentions/responses. Threat severity presents users’ belief on how serious a threat would 
be to themselves. Threat vulnerability refers to how susceptible users feel in relation to a potential threat 
(Milne et al., 2000). Maladaptive rewards refer to the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards of not protecting 
oneself against the fear-appeal, such as saving time, money and pleasure of being sabotaged (Rogers & 
Prentice-Dunn, 1997). For example, maladaptive rewards can be related to users’ perception to save 
time or money by not following suggested safe InfoSec recommendations (Boss et al., 2015; Rogers & 
Prentice-Dunn, 1997). If these mistakenly perceived maladaptive rewards outweigh the perceived threat 
severity and vulnerability, users may choose the maladaptive responses by intending not to follow the 
recommended protective mechanisms. Conversely, threat must be greater than the maladaptive rewards 
for an adaptive response to happen (Boss et al., 2015).   
Coping appraisal is the procedure of considering user’s response efficacy, self-efficacy and the costs of 
accomplishing the adaptive response in relation to the fear-appeal (Floyd et al. 2000; Rogers & Prentice-
Dunn, 1997).  Response efficacy refers to a user’s belief that an adaptive response will work in 
protecting the self or others (Floyd et al., 2000). Self-efficacy refers to a user’s perception about self-
ability and skill to perform the coping response (Floyd et al., 2000). Response cost refers to any cost 
(e.g., time, monetary cost) associated with the coping response (Floyd et al., 2000). In a coping appraisal 
process, response and self-efficacy must be greater than the response cost for an adaptive response to 
happen (Boss et al., 2015). 
Protection intentions are about users’ intention to protect themselves against the threat raised in the 
fear-appeal (Boss et al., 2015). Adaptive response refers to an intentional response to fear-appeal that 
protects self or others against the threat raised in the fear-appeal (Floyd et al., 2000; Rogers & Prentice-
Dunn, 1997).  
Despite the relevance of PMT in explaining InfoSec intention and behaviour, most of prior research 
investigated only the core element of PMT (partial nomologies). As a result, fear and maladaptive 
rewards were excluded from the PMT model (e.g., Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Hanus & Wu, 
2016; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010). To address this gap, this study will develop a 
full nomology of PMT to explain InfoSec intentions.  
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Research Model and Hypotheses 
This study proposes the research model that applies the full nomology of PMT to evaluate the impact 
of users’ InfoSec awareness on their security protection intention through threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal mechanisms (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  The research model 
This study considers users’ InfoSec awareness as a multidimensional variable that includes threat 
awareness and countermeasure awareness. SETA programmes are not only about providing different 
InfoSec contents for target audiences. They also provide general information about InfoSec 
environment, potential threats, and actions against InfoSec violations as well as raise users’ awareness 
of accountability for their actions in a comprehensive way (D’Arcy et al., 2009) such as threat 
identifications and countermeasure actions (Hanus & Wu, 2016). For example, SETA workshops will 
be ineffective if users only learn about different types of countermeasures against potential threats, but 
do not learn how to recognise and identify these threats in the first place. Similarly, objectives of SETA 
programmes will not be successfully met, if users are only able to identify threats and risk but do not 
know how to avoid them. Both threat and countermeasure awareness is likely to materialise if target 
audiences are provided with proper InfoSec training programmes such as customised workshops, 
courses, posters, regular emails and brochures. Hence, we hypothesise: 
H1a,b: SETA programme will positively influence users’ threat and countermeasure awareness.   
 
Users’ knowledge about security threats results in more accurate anticipation about the vulnerability 
and risks associated with threats. A better understanding about the intensity of negative impact of threats 
and the likelihood of being impacted by those threats would enable users to better estimate the 
associated risks and to avoid them. In addition, previous research reported the positive association of 
users’ threat awareness and perceived severity and vulnerability of threat (Hanus & Wu, 2016). The 
other element of threat appraisal that has been missing from previous research is maladaptive rewards 
that have an impact on the threat appraisal process (Boss et al., 2015). Users’ knowledge and awareness 
about InfoSec threats and their negative impact would diminish their perception of earning pseudo-
benefits from denying InfoSec guidelines known as maladaptive rewards. On the other hand, users 
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would be able to estimate the likelihood of implementing solutions against InfoSec threat, if they are 
aware of these possible solutions (Hanus & Wu, 2016). If users know about available countermeasures 
against InfoSec threats, they are likely to recognise the benefit of recommended InfoSec responses to 
protect themselves. Similarly, if users obtain knowledge about potential solutions against threats, they 
would have higher confidence in their competencies to take these protective responses. Therefore, threat 
awareness will positively influence threat appraisal process through perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability. Moreover, threat awareness will negatively influence maladaptive rewards. In contrast, 
countermeasure awareness positively influences coping appraisal through response efficacy, self-
efficacy. Reversely, countermeasure awareness negatively influences response cost. Thus, we 
hypothesise: 
H2a,b,c: Users’ threat awareness will positively influence their perceived severity (H2a) and 
vulnerability of threat (H2b) and will negatively influence their maladaptive rewards perception (H2c). 
H3a,b,c: Users’ countermeasure awareness will positively influence their response efficacy (H3a) and 
self-efficacy (H3b), and will negatively influence their response cost perception (H3c). 
 
PMT explains how users cognitively appraise positive or negative responses and are motivated to 
perform a certain behaviour (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). According to the extended model of 
PMT, threat appraisal involves three cognitive factors namely perceived vulnerability, perceived threat 
and maladaptive rewards (Boss et al., 2015). When users feel vulnerable against a threat, they would be 
more inclined to accomplish the recommended processes to counter such threat (Rogers, 1975). It is 
also reported that users’ intention to perform InfoSec protection behaviours would increase if they 
perceive themselves to be vulnerable against threats (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). Similarly, 
users intend to be more protective if they perceive the severity of threat (Rogers, 1975).  On the other 
hand, users’ realised benefits of performing risky unsecure actions (maladaptive rewards) such as saving 
time, money or psychological pleasure or peer approval would weaken their intention to perform 
adaptive protective responses (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H4a: Users’ perceived severity will positively influence their intention to perform InfoSec protective 
behaviours. 
H4b: Users’ perceived vulnerability will positively influence their intention to perform InfoSec 
protective behaviours. 
H4c: Users’ maladaptive rewards will negatively influence their intention to perform InfoSec protective 
behaviours. 
 
Users engage in the cognitive appraisal when they are confronted with a stressful or negative emotional 
situation. In addition, the motivation to consider the threat further depends on users’ perception of 
existing vulnerability. If users perceive a relevant and severe threat, then fear, which is a negative 
emotional response, is generated as an outcome. Previous studies found that threat vulnerability and 
threat severity predict fear (Floyd et al., 2000; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Therefore, we posit 
that: 
H5a: Users’ perceived severity will positively influence their perceived fear. 
H5b: Users’ perceived vulnerability will positively influence their perceived fear. 
 
According to PMT and relevant empirical studies, invoking fear leads users to take protective 
instructions more seriously (Boss et al., 2015; Rogers, 1975). Ideally, a strong fear appeal should be 
introduced in order to measure fear and explore the role of fear in mediating the relationship between 
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability and security protection intention (Boss et al., 2015). 
Therefore, if a sense of InfoSec fear is emerged, a user is more likely to intend to perform security 
protection responses. Thus, we hypothesise: 
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H6: Users’ fear will positively influence their intention to perform InfoSec protective behaviours. 
 
PMT theorises that, parallel with the threat appraisal, users perform the coping appraisal that 
subsequently shapes their intention to perform protective behaviours. Users intend to engage in adaptive 
responses if they perceive that those behaviours are effective and they believe in their abilities to 
perform those behaviours (Boss et al., 2015; Rogers, 1975). Users’ self-efficacy has an impact on their 
ability to perform protective tasks. Previous research found that users with a high level of self-efficacy 
performed InfoSec tasks in their workplace more than those with a low level of self-efficacy (Ifinedo, 
2012). In contrast, the costs of performing the behaviours such as time required or inconvenience would 
diminish the intention to engage in protective behaviours (Rogers, 1975). Thus, users are reluctant to 
adopt the recommended InfoSec responses if they perceive that a considerable amount of resource (time, 
effort, and money) will be expended toward that effort (Ifinedo, 2012; Milne et al., 2000). As a result, 
we hypothesise: 
H7a: Users’ response efficacy will positively influence their intention to perform InfoSec protective 
behaviours. 
H7b: Users’ self-efficacy will positively influence their intention to perform InfoSec protective 
behaviours. 
H7c: Users’ response cost will negatively influence their intention to perform InfoSec protective 
behaviours. 
 
Research Methodology and Pilot Data Analysis 
We will conduct a cross-sectional field experiment and use a fear-appeal message to study user security 
protection intentions. Samples of tertiary students from two institutions in New Zealand have been 
selected. One group of participants will not receive a fear-appeal message. The other group of 
participants will receive a fear-appeal message that presents the actual statistics of cybercrimes in New 
Zealand such as different types of cyber-attacks, frequency of data losses and financial and non-
financial harm of data loss. Then, an online survey will be administered to all participants. All 
measurement items in the survey instrument are adapted from previous studies (Boss et al., 2015; 
D'Arcy, Hovav & Galletta, 2009; Hanus & Wu, 2016), and measured on a seven-point Likert scale.  
In order to fine-tune the survey, the questionnaire was evaluated and refined in two steps: pre-test and 
pilot study. The questionnaire was pretested with five knowledgeable experts. Modifications were made 
based on their comments. Then, a pilot study was conducted with the purpose of collecting a small set 
of data to refine the questionnaire and assess the reliability and validity of the measurement model. The 
pilot study was conducted with a sample of higher education students at a college in Auckland, New 
Zealand in February 2018. A comment box was provided for participants to give comments on the 
questionnaire at the end of the survey. Findings of the pilot study from 47 participants indicate that 
there are no major difficulties in understanding the instructions and questionnaire items. In the 
measurement model, all items exhibit high loadings (>0.65), except some items (TA3, TA4, TA8, TA9, 
FEAR1, MALR5, MALR6, RCOS1, RCOS2, RCOS4) from treat awareness, fear, maladaptive rewards, 
and response cost constructs.  Besides these low loadings values, the rest range from 0.66 to 0.96 on 
their respective constructs. The items with lower than 0.65 loadings will be removed for the main study. 
The composite reliability of all constructs is 0.85 or higher, which indicates that the constructs are 
within accepted limits and therefore reliable. All items except the treat awareness construct had average 
variance extracted (AVE) values ranging from 0.55 to 0.89, which is considered adequate (>0.5, 
suggesting that convergent validity is sufficient. Reliability of all the indicators is acceptable except for 
a few indicators of treat awareness and fear (TA4, TA9 and FEAR1), which are removed from the 
questionnaire for the main study.  
The planned procedural remedies for controlling common method bias (CMB) are the followings: 
providing clear and concise questions in the questionnaire and assuring respondents’ anonymity. In 
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addition, the Harmon single-factor test will be used to evaluate if such bias is indeed a problem in this 
study. 
 
Expected Contributions 
This research extends the current body of knowledge by examining both threat awareness and 
countermeasure awareness associated with SETA programme as predictors of coping and threat 
appraisal processes and subsequent security protection intentions. It offers an insight into the intricate 
relationship between InfoSec threat and countermeasure awareness and the cognitive processes 
involved in explaining users’ InfoSec protection intentions. This study highlights the role of fear-appeal 
manipulations in InfoSec studies. This suggestion is in line with the report from Boss and colleagues 
(2015) that fear-appeal manipulation is a core component of the underlying protective behaviours, 
according to PMT. In addition, most previous studies (e.g., Marett et al., 2011) that applied fear-appeal 
manipulation used one sample for the model that may convolute the results by failing to identify the 
main differences among effective and ineffective threat and coping appraisals. In contrast, this study 
will use two samples, one with a fear-appeal manipulation and the other without fear-appeal 
manipulation, in order to test the differences of the underlying cognitive processes associated with 
InfoSec protection behaviours. 
The findings of this study will have implications for practice. The findings help practitioners to identify 
important factors that influence users’ InfoSec protection intention. In particular, practitioners may want 
to put more emphasis on the severity of threats, vulnerability of threats or fear-appeal based on the 
findings of study.  
Practitioners can use the findings to put more emphasis in developing effective InfoSec awareness, 
educational and training programmes that incorporate both threat and countermeasure awareness within 
organisations. The findings can also be used to guide the design of InfoSec measures that balance the 
differences between users’ perception about their InfoSec knowledge and protection actions and how 
they are intended to engage in InfoSec protection behaviours. Furthermore, these findings will be 
especially useful for higher education institutions that are considering or currently adopting bring your 
own device practices in classrooms to deliver appropriate InfoSec campaigns and courses to their 
students. 
 
Limitations 
The cross-sectional design of this study may limit the interpretation of the results. Hence, future studies 
may want to observe any changes in users’ InfoSec protection intention and behaviours through fear-
appeal conditions over time. Future research may investigate the impact of users’ protective intentions 
on their actual protective behaviours and explore the possibility of InfoSec knowledge transfer between 
work and home settings. 
 
Conclusion  
Due to the prevalent role of digital technology and the Internet in people’s lives, users’ InfoSec 
awareness is important for the safe and secure global community. Drawing on the full explanation of 
PMT, this study offers in-depth insights into how users’ InfoSec awareness shapes and motivates their 
InfoSec protection intentions. This research extends the current body of knowledge by introducing 
SETA programmes as an antecedent of threat and countermeasure InfoSec awareness, which are 
antecedents of InfoSec protection intentions mediated by coping and threat appraisals.  
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